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I. INTRODUCTION

“Now, as a nation, we don’t promise equal outcomes, but we were
founded on the idea everyone should have an equal opportunity to
succeed.”1
In June of 2017, the European Commission levied the largest
competition fines in its history against tech giant, Google.2 The
Commission ruled that Google was unlawfully taking advantage of its
position as the preeminent search engine in Europe to buoy another one
of its businesses by automatically placing search results from its pricecomparison site, Google Shopping, at the top of user product searches.3
*J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law. The author would like to
thank Professor David Opderbeck for all of his helpful feedback and notes and
Professor Narjan Peters for her help selecting the topic.
1
President Barack H. Obama, Remarks by the President at College
Opportunity Summit (Dec. 4, 2014) (Transcript available at https://obamawhite
house.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/04/remarks-president-collegeopportunity-summit).
2
Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google
€2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance (June 27, 2017).
3
Id.
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On the day the fines were announced, Margrethe Vestager, the EU’s
Commissioner for Competition, explained the reasoning behind the fines
in an interview with CNBC.4 In her explanation, Vestager focused on
Google’s “dominance” of the search engine market and its use of this
dominance to manipulate the internet price-comparison market in favor
of Google Shopping.5 According to Vestager, the fines were levied to
protect market competition.6 Challenging her reasoning, CNBC host
Sara Eisen questioned whether Google should be punished for taking the
steps necessary to succeed against the likes of Amazon and eBay. 7 While
Eisen’s rebuttal was a simple one, it is indicative of the different
approaches taken by the United States and the European Union in
addressing tech companies’ bias in favor of their own products and lateral
businesses.8
Since the beginning of the decade, the European Commission has
challenged Google to comport with European laws enacted to prevent
dominant companies from using their position to further profit
themselves in other areas.9 In contrast, the United States has done next
to nothing to maintain a level playing field, particularly for search
engines, which are utilized daily by a majority of American internet
users.10
The European laws on which the Commission’s decision was based,
namely Article 102 of the Treaty on the Function of the European Union
and Article 54 of the Agreement on European Economic Area (“EEA
Agreement”), are competition laws similar to American antitrust
statutes.11 Both seek to prevent parties, particularly those in a position to
dominate their market, from artificially reducing or handicapping

4
Maragrethe Vestager, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager_en (last viewed on Feb. 2, 2019)
(As the EC’s Competition Commissioner, Vestager is responsible for “enforcing
competition rules in the areas of antitrust, cartels, mergers, and state aid”).
5
Interview by Sara Eisen with Margrethe Vestager, European Competition
Commissioner (Jun. 27, 2017).
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Leo Keion, Google hit with record EU fine over Shopping service, BBC (Jun.
27, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40406542.
10
Amanda DiSilvestro, Who Uses Search Engines? 92% of Adult U.S. Internet
Users [Study], SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (Aug. 11, 2011), https://searchengine
watch.com/sew/study/2101282/search-engines-92-adult-internet-users-study
11
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 102, 2008 O.J. C 115/47; Agreement on the European Economic Area, March
17, 1993, O.J. No. L 1,3.1994.
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competition to the detriment of consumers.12 Despite these similarities,
American government agencies charged with enforcing competition laws
have been unwilling to take action against such violations, with that of
Google being the primary example.13 This can be most obviously seen in
the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) decision not to bring action
against Google for biasing its searches to benefit its other business
ventures, such as Google Shopping.14
Using the European Commission’s action against Google as a case
study, this note will examine whether a market-dominant search engine
(in this case, Google) is permitted under U.S. law to give preferential
search treatment to its collateral businesses, despite the potential harm to
the market and consumers. The next section will examine, in greater
detail, the Commission’s investigation into Google’s practices, its
eventual ruling and justifications for it, and the United States’ history of
inaction against Google for providing preferential searches to its users.
The following section will examine whether or not American law allows
for a successful claim in a theoretical case against Google, and later
possible laws that could be implemented or actions that could be taken to
reform American antitrust law for the purposes of creating a more
balanced market for all competitors.15
II. BACKGROUND OVERVIEW

This section will discuss the European Commission’s decision to
fine Google a record €2.42B for abuse of its market dominance as well
as the statutes that formed the basis of that decision.16 It will also discuss
how the European Commission’s action in this area has diverged from its
American counterparts, namely the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”).17

12

Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 102, 2008 O.J. C 115/47; Agreement on the European Economic Area, March
17, 1993, O.J. No. L 1,3.1994.
13
See generally, Memorandum from [Redacted] to FTC (Aug. 8, 2012)
(regarding the FTC’s pending decisions to bring charges against Google for their use
of search biases).
14
Id.
15
The scope of this examination will be limited to anti-trust statutes and case
law.
16
Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google
€2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance (June 27, 2017).
17
Memorandum from [Redacted] to FTC (Aug. 8, 2012).
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A. European Commission’s Investigations of Google (November
2010–June 2017)

Price-comparison site, “Google Shopping” (known first as
“Froogle”), was established in December of 2002.18 The site allows
consumers to compare prices of similar or identical products from
different sources, providing them with the most cost-effective search
results.19 Entering into a market with established brand names, the
fledgling site struggled, leading one internal memo at Google to assert
that “Froogle simply doesn’t work.”20
Between 2008 and 2013, Google began adapting its search results
across Europe, as it did in the United States, in two major ways. 21 First,
Google increased the exposure of Google Shopping by placing price
comparisons from the site at the top of searches of Google’s main search
engine (google.com) for applicable products.22 After placing price
comparison results linked to Google Shopping at the top of Google
searches, web traffic to Google Shopping skyrocketed and increased the
site’s advertising revenue.23 Additionally, Google altered its algorithms
to force rival price comparison websites out of the immediate view of
Google search users.24 By forcing results of its competitors’ home pages
on to subsequent Google search result pages, Google reduced users views
of these sites exponentially.25 European Commission surveys indicate
that web traffic to links on the first page of Google’s search results
account for ninety-five percent of all users, while the first link on the
second page accrues one percent.26 By employing these practices,
18
Google Launches Shopping Site, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ONLINE (Dec.
12, 2002, 6:04 PM), https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid
=65eb1bd5-bf33-4b73-9dd7-7e37ddbe1eb3&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2F
document%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A4F1H-0HS0-TWV6-932P00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A4F1H-0HS0-TWV6-932P-0000000&pdcontentcomponentid=280007&pdteaserkey=sr7&ecomp=kyffk&earg=sr7&
prid=1391d86f-2be1-4f04-91d6-2a6ecd8c5b3b.
19
Id.
20
Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission fines Google
€2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage
to Own Comparison Shopping Service (June 27, 2017).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission fines Google
€2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage
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Google hampered competitors’ ability to compete.27
In response to the reaction of competing price-comparison websites,
the Commission opened proceedings against Google in November
2010.28 The Commission’s announcement stated, in part, that the
Commission would investigate “whether Google ha[d] abused a
dominant market position in online search” in its promotion of Google
Shopping and demotion of rival sites.29 Such actions, the Commission
asserted, violate European anti-competition law.30 In addition, the
Commission also included several other potential violations related to
Google’s discrimination against rival businesses in its advertisements,
including claims that Google had misused its phone software to the
detriment of competitors.31
Reaching a “preliminary conclusion” on the illegality of Google’s
practices in March of 2013, Google and the European Commission
discussed potential methods to bring Google into compliance with
European antitrust laws.32 Google proposed placing links from Google
Shopping within a distinguishable frame, while noting that the
information was “promoted” by Google and modifying its algorithm to
increase competitors’ visibility.33 In February of 2014, Google increased
its offer by assuring the Commission that it would make at least three
links to competitive price-comparing websites visible in searches where
Google Shopping links were promoted.34 While the agreement
temporarily alleviated the Commission’s concerns, the Commission
reinstituted its proceedings against Google, as well as parent company
Alphabet, on July 14, 2016.35
to Own Comparison Shopping Service (June 27, 2017).
27
European Commission Fact Sheet IP/17/1784, Antitrust: Commission fines
Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as search engine by giving illegal
advantage to own comparison shopping service – Factsheet (Jun. 27, 2017).
28
Id.
29
Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Probes
Allegations of Antitrust Violations by Google (Nov. 30, 2010).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Seeks
Feedback on Commitments Offered by Google to Address Competition Concerns
(Apr. 25, 2013).
33
Id.
34
Press Release, European Commission Press Release, Antitrust: Commission
Obtains from Google Comparable Display of Specialized Search Rivals (Feb. 5,
2014).
35
Vice President Joaqin Almuia, Statement at the Midday press briefing on
Commission’s Statement of Objections sent to Microsoft (Feb. 5, 2014); European
Commission Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Takes
Further Steps in Investigations Alleging Google’s Comparison Shopping and
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After nearly a year of further investigation, the European
Commission’s inquiry into Google’s search biases came to an end.36 In
a published memoranda, the Commission asserted that Google “abused
its market dominance as a search engine by giving an illegal advantage
to another Google product.”37 In its decision to fine Google, the
Commission focused on the company’s “market dominance” in the
search engine market across all thirty-one countries within the European
Economic Area (“EEA”).38 The Commission asserted that Google had
controlled around 90 percent of the market share for general internet
searches since 2008, when it first adopted its volatile search bias
practices.39 Since Google adopted these practices, the Commission had
observed an exponential increase in web traffic to Google Shopping.40
Since 2008, Google Shopping had increased traffic by about 45,000
percent in the United Kingdom, 35,000 percent in Germany, 19,000
percent in France, 29,000 percent in the Netherlands, 17,000 percent in
Spain, and 14,000 percent in Italy.41 During that same period, the
Commission identified that price comparison websites competing with
Google Shopping experienced decreases in web traffic as high as 92
percent in some countries.42
However, such patterns have not been limited to Europe, as they
have also gained traction in the United States, where Google’s practices
of promoting Google Shopping and demoting its rivals were also
implemented.43 According to the FTC, between July of 2007 and 2008,
Google Shopping skyrocketed from the seventh-most-trafficked price
comparison site to the most-trafficked such site.44
Advertising-Related Practices Breach EU Rules (July 14, 2016); Press Release,
European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to
Google on Comparison Shopping Service; Opens Separate Formal Investigations on
Android (April 15, 2015).
36
European Commission Fact Sheet IP/17/1784, Antitrust: Commission fines
Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as search engine by giving illegal
advantage to own comparison shopping service – Factsheet (Jun. 27, 2017).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google
€2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage
to Own Comparison Shopping Service (Jun. 27, 2017).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Memorandum
from [Redacted]
to
FTC
(Aug.
8,
2012),
https://www.benedelman.org/pdf/ftc-google-8aug2012.pdf (regarding the FTC’s
pending decisions to bring charges against Google for their use of search biases).
44
See generally, Memorandum from [Redacted] to FTC (Aug. 8, 2012),
https://www.benedelman.org/pdf/ftc-google-8aug2012.pdf.
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The basis for the European Commission’s decision to fine Google
came through two major laws: (1) Article 102 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, and (2) Article 54 of the European
Economic Area (EEA) Agreement.45 According to the European
Commission’s press release following its levying of Google’s fine, both
of these laws govern antitrust violations for parties holding a “dominant
position” in their market.46
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Function of the European Union
(“TFEU”) was written as the bedrock document of the newly-established
European Union.47 Article 102 requires that leading businesses do not
abuse the power they wield in their given markets to prevent competition
or use that power to unfairly muscle itself into other areas.48 Within its
text, Article 102 provides examples of abuse within the Article’s text and
includes unfair pricing, intentionally limiting production, and price
gouging.49
A violation of Article 102 occurs when: (1) the accused has a
dominant market position, and (2) that dominant market position has been
abused by the accused.50 To determine whether the accused holds a
dominant market position, the Commission must agree on a precise
definition of what the market is. The Commission makes this
determination by examining both the goods or services being provided,
as well as the geographic parameters relevant in determining the
competition against the accused.51 Once the parameters of the relevant
market are established, factors such as market share (when over 40%),
ease of entering into the market, and size and resources of the accused
company factor into whether the business has a dominant market
position.52 In this case, Google had acquired as much as 92% of the
market share for search engines in EEA countries, achieving well over
40% in each of the EEA’s 31 economic areas across Europe.53
45

Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google
€2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage
to Own Comparison Shopping Service (Jun. 27, 2017).
46
Id.
47
Antitrust: Overview, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu
/competition/antitrust/overview_en.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
48
Id.
49
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 102, 2008 O.J. C 115/47.
50
Antitrust Procedures in Abuse of Dominance (Article 102 TFEU cases),
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/procedures
102_en.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google
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The Commission considers whether the company took action to
“distort” the competition in deciding whether the dominant company has
abused its dominance in a given economic market.54 In its decision, the
Commission ruled that Google used its dominant search engines to
artificially promote its comparison-shopping website, at the expense of
its competitors.55 As a result, Google’s actions constituted an abuse of
its dominant power over the search engine market expressly forbidden by
Article 102 of the TFEU, and violation of European anti-competition
law.56
The latter statute, Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, makes illegal
any action taken by a dominant market player that may artificially affect
trade in any way.57 Article 54 provides examples such as price gouging,
limiting production of goods, and requiring other parties to make
agreements unrelated to business in order to assure continued partnership
with the dominant party.58 The statute covers many of the same anti-trust
infractions as Article 102 of the TEFU and was itself used in the
Commission’s claim against Google.59 Once again, by using its success
to artificially prop up Google Shopping, its own vertical business, Google
was found to have abused its dominant market position.60
B. American Investigation into Google’s Search Bias Practices

Not long after the European Commission began its investigation of
Google’s search applications, the United States’ consumer protection
agency, the FTC, began its own investigation into Google’s alleged
search biases.61 In a complaint against the company, several pricecomparing sites raised the issue of Google’s favoritism towards Google
€2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage
to Own Comparison Shopping Service (Jun. 27, 2017).
54
Antitrust Procedures in Abuse of Dominance (Article 102 TFEU cases),
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/
procedures_102_en.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Agreement on the European Economic Area, March 17, 1993, O.J. No. L 1,
3.1994.
58
Id.
59
Press Release, European Union, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42
Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to
Own Comparison Shopping Service (Jun. 27, 2017).
60
Id.
61
Vauhini Vara, Were Google’s Practices Anti-Competitive or Just AntiCompetitor, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 21, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com
/business/currency/were-googles-practices-anti-competitive-or-just-anticompetitor.
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Shopping to the FTC.62 For two years, the FTC delved into Google’s
promotion of its own products and demotion of its competitors.63 As part
of the investigation, the FTC interviewed employees of Google and its
competitors, while also conducting searches of its own to learn the extent
of the affect that these practices had on Google Shopping’s competitors.64
Ultimately, the FTC prepared an internal report in which it decided
not to bring formal action against Google, either under Section 2 of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act or Section 5 of the FTC Act.65 In the FTC’s
judgment, Google’s practices were not designed to harm competitors.66
Rather, just as Sara Eisen put it in her CNBC interview with Margrethe
Vestager, Google took such action as a means of making its universal
search engine a more efficient product to better compete in a crowded
field.67 By placing direct links to Google Shopping at the top of searches
for products, Google allowed for the streamlining of a user’s
experience.68 According to the FTC’s determination, this structure would
allow customers to accomplish their search goals more efficiently. 69 To
the FTC, Google’s actions served as “legitimate product improvements,”
and found no official wrongdoing in Google’s placement of Google
Shopping.70
III. ANALYSIS – AMERICAN LAW AND FAIR SEARCH RESULTS
A. Search Bias and American Law

This section will examine whether American law would allow for
the regulation of search biases in its current state. While appearing to be
based on the same logic and steps as EFEU Section 102 and Article 54 of
the EEA Agreement, U.S. the current bulwark of American anti-trust law,
Sherman Antitrust Act, does not appear to provide the government with
the authority to stop Google from promoting its business over
competitors.71 The Sherman Antitrust Act is the law most likely to be
62

Id.
Id.
64
Id.
65
Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search
Practices, In the Matter of Google Inc., (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov
/system/files/documents/public_statements/295971/130103googlesearchstmtofcom
m.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 102, 2008 O.J. C 115/47; Agreement on the European Economic Area, March
63
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employed by the FTC in such a case against Google.72 The Sherman Act
is broken into two major sections: Section 1 of the Act is largely focused
on precluding collusion between two or more parties to assure success in
a given market, while Section 2 places more focus on unilateral actions
taken by a single party to hamper competition.73 Since it does not appear
that Google took action with the assistance of any other party or entity,
the FTC will likely bring its action under Section 2 of the Act.74
Section 2 of the Sherman Act establishes three different offenses that
can be brought against defendants: (1) “monopolization,” (2) “attempted
monopolization,” and (3) “conspiracy to monopolize.”75 Section 2 has
previously served as the bedrock of anti-competition claims brought in
federal court, including those involving major technology companies.76
In United States v. Microsoft Corporation,77 a landmark case before the
D.C. Court of Appeals, the federal government brought action against
blue-chip computer giant Microsoft. The government alleged that
Microsoft violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by creating a monopoly
of computer operating systems and conspired to monopolize internet
browsers in the midst of the tech boom at the turn of the millennium.78
The case came at the end of a series of actions by competitors against
Microsoft spanning much of the 1990s.79 The series of cases swirled
around Microsoft’s ground-breaking “Windows” operating system and
its automatic installation on personal computers, or “PCs,” which had
begun to garner the ubiquitous presence in homes that they maintain to
this day.80 Before the D.C. Circuit on appeal was whether Microsoft’s
control of the operating system software market with its Windows
operating system was the result of “monopolization” banned under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.81
17, 1993, O.J. No. L 1,3.1994.
72
The Antitrust Laws, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Feb. 2,
2019).
73
Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise. . .is hereby declared illegal”); William F. Adkinson, Jr., et al.,
ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 2-3
(Federal Trade Commission, 2008).
74
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2019).
75
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2019); William F. Adkinson, Jr., et al., ENFORCEMENT OF
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 2-3 (Federal Trade
Commission, 2008).
76
See United States. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
77
Id. at 45.
78
Id. at 47.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
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To establish whether Microsoft engaged in illegal monopolization,
the D.C. Circuit employed the two-part test first formulated in United
States v. Grinnell Corp.82 To sustain a claim for a violation of Section
2’s monopolization prohibition, the Grinnell test requires that: (1) the
defendant corporation possesses a monopoly in the “relevant market” in
question; and (2) this monopoly was maintained through the company’s
misuse of that monopoly power, rather than through acceptable means, to
control the market.83
To establish the existence of Microsoft’s operating system
monopoly, the court first set out to ascertain the definition of two of the
first factor’s operative terms: “monopoly power” and “relevant
market.”84 Although the Supreme Court in United States v, E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co. asserted that a party’s ability to manipulate the price
of its goods beyond their competitors’ ability to participate established a
monopoly, later cases ruled the monopoly power may be inferred by
showing a “dominant” share of the product’s “relevant market.”85
In defining what constitutes a “relevant market,” the court in
Microsoft took a relatively narrow approach.86 Based on the Supreme
Court’s decision in du Point, the court considered only those products
which are “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same
purpose.”87 Greatly impacting Microsoft’s market power, the court
limited the relevant market to operating systems running on Intel
processors, thus rendering Apple’s OS operating system and
“middleware” out of the scope of market definition.88 Leaving out both
of these operating systems out of the relevant market left Windows with
a ninety-five percent share of the defined market, which the court deemed
sufficient to prove monopoly power.89
Since the presence of a monopoly in itself does not establish
monopolization claim, the court in Microsoft examined whether or not a
82

Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 50.
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966) (“(1) the possession
of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident”).
84
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
85
Id. (citing Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir.
1995)).
86
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 52.
87
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956)
(examining Section 2 monopolization claims against defendant’s cellophane
business).
88
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 52-54.
89
Id. at 52-58; See also Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 571 (ruling that 87% market
share is sufficient for monopoly power).
83
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monopoly was obtained through conduct that could be deemed exclusory
to other members of the relevant market.90 Determining whether the
defendant has acted in an anti-competitive manner is established through
a four-factor, shifting-sands test established in Spectrum Sports, Inc. v.
McQuillan.91
To prove anti-competitiveness, the plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) the defendant’s actions had a negative impact on the
“competitive process” and (2) that the harm sustained was meant to be
prevented under the statute.92 After meeting these two factors, the
defendant is (3) given the opportunity to provide justification for its
actions, after which (4) the onus returns to the plaintiff to establish that
the harm pales in comparison to their “pro-competitive” benefits.93
In its own examination, the court in Microsoft, citing previous cases,
asserted that “courts are properly skeptical about claims that competition
has been harmed by a dominant firm’s product design changes.”94 The
court felt that ruling against certain design modifications would create a
chilling effect on product innovation.95 By integrating Internet Explorer
to Windows 95, Microsoft made it impossible to delete its web browser,
which served as the default browser in certain situations. 96 Competitors
in the web browser market argued that having Internet Explorer
integrated into ninety-five percent of the nation’s computers would limit
consumer options and harm competition.97 Although it provided no such
justification for why Microsoft precluded users from removing Internet
Explorer from the software (in violation of Section 2), the D.C. Circuit
Court deemed that the integration of Internet Explorer onto the Windows
operating system, which then opened Internet Explorer automatically
(despite the user’s choice of another default browser), did have relevant
technical justifications.98 With Microsoft arguing that the default use of
Internet Explorer would allow for a more user-friendly experience, which
allowed “users to move seamlessly from local storage devices to the Web
in the same browsing window.”99 Asserting that the government had not
provided an adequate rebuttal to Microsoft’s pro-business argument, the
court found that the integration of Internet Explorer into Windows to be
90

Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 58.
Id. at 52-58; Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
92
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 58; Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 458.
93
Id. at 59.
94
Id. at 65 (citing Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, Co., 703 F.2d
534, 544-45 (9th Cir. 1983)).
95
Id. at 65.
96
Id. at 64-65.
97
Id.
98
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 67.
99
Id.
91
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a Section 2 violation.100 The D.C. Circuit came to a similar conclusion
in examining Microsoft’s promotion of its own Java Virtual Machine
(“JVM”) over the JVM produced by Sun Microsystems, which Microsoft
made incompatible with Internet Explorer.101 The court, once again
found that the pro-competitive nature of the promotion of its own product
superseded the negative impacts placed on Sun Microsystems and the
market and therefore was not a violation of monopolization laws.102
After completing its discussion of monopolization, D.C. Circuit
Court moved to claims of “attempted monopolization” under Section 2
of the Sherman Act.103 Like the monopolization test, the Supreme Court
in Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan established a three-part test for
finding the existence Section 2 attempted monopolization, requiring that
plaintiff: (1) establish that the defendant participated in “predatory or
anticompetitive conduct”; (2) sought to create a monopoly; and (3) had a
“dangerous probability” of obtaining such a monopoly. 104 Honing in on
plaintiff’s claims that agreements between Microsoft and main rival
Netscape would give Microsoft a monopoly of the web browser market,
the Circuit Court found that Microsoft had a “dangerous probability” of
monopolizing the web browser market and overturned the lower court’s
ruling.105
Within the “dangerous probability” factor of the larger Spectrum
Sports attempted monopolization test, a plaintiff must first show that the
market it claims the defendant is attempting to monopolize can, in fact,
be monopolized by a single entity. 106 To do so, a plaintiff has to (1)
establish the relevant market to be monopolized, and (2) show that
“substantial barriers” limit the entry of competition.107 Quickly
dismissing plaintiff’s attempted monopolization claim, the court held that
the parties did not properly establish the relevant market that Microsoft
sought to monopolize.108
The court found no need to seek clarification of the definition for the
market or to remand the case back to the lower court, repeating plaintiff’s
responsibility for establishing such a definition to demonstrate a
100

Id.
Id. at 74-75.
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Id. at 75.
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Id. at 80; 15 U.S.C. § 2 (“Every person who shall . . . attempt to
monopolize . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”).
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Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 80 (citing Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan,
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likelihood of monopolization in the future.109 The court asserted that the
government also fell short in establishing the “significant barriers” to
enter into the market.110 Standing alone, the government’s failure to
define the monopolized market was sufficient to dismiss the claim of
monopolization.111 Additionally, the government was unable to show the
barriers erected by Microsoft gave them “the ability to lessen or destroy
competition in that market,” the standard set forth in Spectrum Sports to
determine the requisite difficulty of entry, or that Microsoft would control
such power as to make it impossible to enter into the market. 112 Despite
the plaintiff’s argument that such a purchase would have for Microsoft
amounted to a significant barrier, asserting that it would create a
preference for Microsoft among users in the absence of any recognizable
alternative, the court found such findings insufficient to establish an
insurmountable barrier.113 As the Spectrum Sports test is conjunctive,
the D.C. Circuit Court reversed the lower court’s decision in favor of the
plaintiff without discussing the merits of the first two factors. 114
The court in Microsoft provides an important, tech-based example
of how American courts would likely rule on Section 2 monopolization
and attempted monopolization claims involving Google’s search biases.
In this case, it is likely that Google’s promotion of Google Shopping
would be reasonably interpreted as procompetitive. With limited barriers
preventing parties from entering into field on the internet, a claim of § 2
monopolization and attempted monopolization claims against Google
would not hold.
To examine a potential claim of monopolization in this case, a court
would first return to the two-part monopolization test set forth in
Grinnell.115 Although it would be difficult to conclude that Google
Shopping ever had a monopoly in the saturated online price comparison
market, it is irrefutable that Google holds a monopoly over the internet
search engine market, a relevant market that the FTC defines narrowly as
“[h]orizontal, algorithm web search.”116 As the Supreme Court in
Grinnell established, and the court in Microsoft reinforced, monopoly
Id. at 81 (“we would normally remand this case . . . [a] remand on market
definition is unnecessary, however, because the District Court’s imprecision is
directly traceable to the plaintiffs’ failure to articulate and identify the evidence
before the District Court . . . .”).
110
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 82.
111
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Id. at 82; Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
113
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 82-83.
114
Id. at 81-82.
115
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
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power is often based on market share within the party’s relevant
market.117 Research reports by web data analytics companies such as
comScore indicate that Google represents 64 percent of the market share
among desktop searches computers in February of 2016.118 This market
share was much higher than any of Google’s competitors, with Bing,
Yahoo, Ask, and AOL representing 21.4, 12.2, 1.7, and 0.9 percent of the
market share respectively.119 While not rising to the levels seen in
Microsoft (ninety-five percent), cases do support finding monopoly
power in companies with similar market shares to Google. 120 Based on
these similar rulings, Google appears to hold a sufficient market share to
be considered a monopoly, as it is the only company in their sector that
controls more than twenty-five percent of the entire market.121
Since the court would like find Google to have monopoly power, the
court would move on the second Grinnell factor: whether intentionally
skewing search results in favor of a company’s own vertical enterprises
in the manner Google has would be considered monopolist.122 As seen
in Microsoft, as well as the FTC’s previous dealings with Google, the
deference paid by the courts and the FTC to design modifications and
pro-competitive reasoning for the structure of a search engine’s results,
would leave most claims of biased search results outside of what has
previously been deemed “monopolistic” activity.123 For example,
Google’s promotion of Google Shopping did not cause the FTC to pursue
legal action under Section 2; they asserted that Google provided
numerous pro-competition and design-based arguments that would have
rebutted any claim of a monopoly and thus the FTC was unlikely to
succeed in a legal proceeding.124
In its argument before the Commission, Google asserted that
117

Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 51.
Adam Lella, comScore Releases February 2016 U.S. Desktop Search Engine
Rankings, COMSCORE (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.comscore.com/Insights/
Rankings/comScore-Releases-February-2016-US-Desktop-Search-EngineRankings.
119
Id.
120
See Image Tech. Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1207 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that a company with 65 percent of the relevant market share had
monopoly power).
121
Adam Lella, comScore Releases February 2016 U.S. Desktop Search Engine
Rankings,, COMSCORE (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.comscore.com/Insights
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U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
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Memorandum from [Redacted] to FTC (Aug. 8, 2012).
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promoting its own vertical companies makes the search engine more
efficient.125 The founder of Google, Sergey Brin, asserted that, by using
Google’s main search engine to search for products, it is searching for
results supported by Google, and the engine merely streamlines the
process by staying on Google rather than jumping to another website.126
Paired with several other arguments set forth to justify promotion of its
own site, Brin’s statement provides evidence of the procompetitive intent
behind the decision to promote Google Shopping. According to prior
case law, he is completely within his rights to take such actions in order
to provide users with the most direct, streamlined experience possible.127
When combined with the minimal cost the promotion of Google
Shopping to consumers, rather than the competitors themselves, it
appears that search engine biases are justifiable, and would not be
considered monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
When examining a potential attempted monopolization of the online
price-comparison market, courts will likely find, as they did in Microsoft,
that there are insufficient barriers to entering the aforementioned
marketplace to establish a claim for attempted monopolization.128 In
attempting to establish Google’s ability to drive parties out of the market,
it is quite clear that plaintiffs would run into a challenge based on the
level of competition Google faces in the online price-comparison
marketplace. With regards to entering the market, the Microsoft court
found that no significant barrier existed to enter the internet browser
market, with limited overhead required to enter the market.129 With large
companies like Microsoft also occupying prominent positions in the
comparison search market, it seems unlikely that a court would find that
Google has the market power to drive parties out. With no evidence
supporting an argument that Google could effectively use its power to
dominate this market, it does not appear that a claim of attempted
monopolization would be successful.
Although Google’s search monopoly appears to be legal, with the
configuration of Google’s searches benefiting Google Shopping arising
out of a competitive desire to improve search efficiency for users, a
potential plaintiff might attempt to attack Google’s search biases using a
wrinkle in Section 2 monopolization law: the “refusal to deal.”130 Unlike
125
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Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 67.
128
Id. at 82; Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
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Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 at 84.
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cases such as Microsoft where the defendant sought to obtain a large
swath of the market it was in, other Section 2 monopolization claims deal
with a company’s refusal to enter into agreements or interact with rival
companies for the purpose of establishing or fortifying the former’s
monopoly.131 A plaintiff may argue that Google’s movement of its
competitors to subsequent search pages has no purpose other than to push
for a monopoly in the price-comparison field, violating the spirit of the
doctrine. However, although earlier cases surrounding the refusal to
agree may have benefitted such a claim, the presence of other search
engines on the market and the Supreme Court’s recent expansion of the
right of companies to refuse to deal with rivals, limits the prospects for
any such claim against Google.132
Cases under the refusal-to-deal method of reasoning began towards
the turn of the century.133 Supreme Court’s first case in this line of
decisions came in United States v. Colgate & Co., where plaintiff brought
suit against defendant’s toiletries business for unlawful collusion.134 In
this case, establishing a line reasoning similar to other Section 2
monopolization claims, Justice James McReynolds established that
businesses were free to choose to turn away business from whoever they
pleased “[i]n the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly.”135 This case would be used to argue for unlawful refusal of
business for much of the next century. 136 The Supreme Court ceased to
use the method after Aspen Skiing, Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.
in 1985.137 In Aspen, the defendant, an operator of three of Aspen’s four
skiing mountains, refused to sell lift tickets to plaintiff, who was the
operator of the final mountain.138 In addition, defendant ceased sales of
multi-mountain passes which included the fourth mountain after the two
parties disagreed over how to split the proceeds from the promotion.139
131

2-25 ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION §205.04 (2nd ed. 2012). See
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (“In the absence of any
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The Court found the defendants in this case were in violation of Section
2 of the Sherman Act, asserting that “attempting to exclude rivals on
some basis other than efficiency” was deemed an anti-competitive act.140
Despite these rulings, the Supreme Court greatly altered their
viewpoint on company’s refusing to work their with competitors in the
Court’s Verizon Communs., Inc. v. Trinko decision.141 This decision was
born in the wake of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which set forth
requirements that telecommunications providers share networks with
companies seeking to move to their location. The plaintiffs, a group of
AT&T customers, claimed that Verizon, originally the only provider in
their area, responded to service complaints from AT&T customers only
after it answered such complaints from Verizon customers.142 In viewing
Aspen Skiing more narrowly, the Court determined that “Verizon’s
alleged insufficient assistance in the provision of service to rivals is not a
recognized antitrust claim under the Court’s ‘refuse to deal’
precedents.”143
Moreover, the Trinko case presents similar facts to the FTC’s
potential suit against Google. As the facts apply to Google, Trinko
demonstrates that such claims do extend to preferential treatment.144 The
claim at issue in Trinko did not focus on a refusal to serve, but rather that
Verizon was Preferencing its own product over the competitor’s
product.145 The Trinko decision, similar to the Microsoft decision
preceding it, allows companies to take action at the expense of rivals
insofar that such action can be shown to accomplish a legitimate business
interest.146 Since the FTC has explicitly mentioned that there are
legitimate business interests of Google’s restructuring of its website–
mainly to promote Google Shopping–it would likely be deemed an
acceptable means to improve the efficiency of user searches. Thus, a
claim brought on the grounds of duty of service would likely fall short
once again.147
B. A Potential Solution – Returning to the “Harvard” School of
Antitrust Philosophy

As Section 2 is currently enforced, configuring search engines to
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
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Verizon Comuns., Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
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Id. at 415-6.
Memorandum from [Redacted] to FTC 28 (Aug. 8, 2012).
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produce search results biased towards the company’s own vertical
companies appear to be within the bounds of American antitrust law.148
Despite previously rulings’ appearance of support for such practice, the
concept of search bias arguably offends the bedrock of the laws that
provide little protection against it.149 This can be seen clearly in the
history of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Act coincided with the
dissolving of several major corporations, and was signed into law during
a period of great industrialization in America.150 At the time, large
businesses began purchasing every intermediate business necessary for
the production of their goods.151 Doing so allowed these businesses to
keep a stranglehold on their concentrated economic power.152 Born out
of grassroots movements seeking to break up these trusts, the Sherman
Act was signed into law with the goal of making products more affordable
for consumers and wages more livable for workers.153 Although
undoubtedly successful since its implementation, the court’s decision in
Microsoft and subsequent cases seem to indicate the ability of modern
technology to circumvent the Sherman Act and establish the type of
artificial market control the Act seeks to eradicate.154 This conflicts with
the basis for antitrust law, and action must be taken to prevent such
practices that harm competition. To correct this issue, courts could return
to a more originalist interpretation of Section 2, one that recognizes the
importance of protecting market competition. However, this would be
inconsistent with the current decisions regarding antitrust cases that
consider a net-positive to consumers.155
The proven historical
effectiveness of the originalist stance could return the enforcement of
Section 2 to its intended goals, while preventing the internet from
circumventing laws that were implemented before the concept of the
internet was conceived.
Over the past five decades, the wide-ranging principles of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, which began as a law for consumers and
producers, have been replaced by a narrower school of thought, limiting

148
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the scope of the once-all-encompassing law.156 In their declawing of the
Sherman Act, the judicial system has created a climate which allows
issues such as Google’s search biases to slip through the cracks. By
returning to this previous model, advocated by such groups as the “New
Brandeis” academic movement, the courts can take action against the
unlawful growth of corporate giants, including Google’s unfair
movement into the price comparison market on the back of its search
engine’s success.157
The original text of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act firmly
placed focus on the actions of the provider, stating:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.158
In a work published by the libertarian Cato Institute, antitrust
scholars William Letwin and Hans Thorelli argue that “the passage of the
Sherman Act was motivated by widespread hostility toward monopoly–
considered to be detrimental to the interests of consumers and small
business and also antithetical to democratic institutions.”159 For a
majority of the statute’s history, courts stood firm in decisions made
under the Act by protecting both consumers and businesses.160 Even the
actions deemed illegal can be beneficial to consumers.161 In his
examination of this court philosophy, dubbed the “Harvard” school of
antitrust theory, Professor Thomas A. Piraino provides examples of this
line of decision-making in cases where antitrust violations are found
despite being a net-benefit to consumers.162 One of the most direct
examples of this school of thought can be seen in Judge Learned Hand’s
opinion in United States v. Aluminum Company of America (“Alcoa”),
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Id. at 346-47.
David Dayen, This Budding Movement Wants to Smash Monopolies, THE
NATION (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/this-budding-movementwants-to-smash-monopolies/.
158
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
159
Robert L. Bradley Jr., On the Origins of the Sherman Antitrust Act, CATO
INSTITUTE, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/
1990/1/cj9n3-13.pdf (last viewed Feb. 2, 2019) (emphasis added).
160
Piraino, supra note 155, at 348-49.
161
Id.
162
Id.
157

RUSSO (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

5/9/2019 2:16 PM

“A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY”

401

before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.163
In Alcoa, the defendant, a company that engaged in the production
of both raw and finished goods made from iron, was sued for violating
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, having amassed what its
competitors argued was a monopoly over the market.164 Owning more
than 80% of its market share, the court found that several of the
defendant’s actions, such as buying up water sources, driving its prices
below the market prices, and purchasing companies for the purpose of
keeping out competition, violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.165 In
establishing its defense, particularly with regard to its ingot monopoly,
Alcoa argued that the fostering of a business that provided low costs for
its consumers and benefits for its investors was an overall positive
venture. Such benefits, defendant argued, could not amount to a violation
of the Sherman Antitrust Act.166 In his opinion Judge Hand recognized
the importance of competition to the markets, asserting that “[m]any
people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens
initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy” for those holding the
monopoly.167 In accordance with the importance of such competition,
Judge Hand asserts that “[i]t is settled . . . that there are some contracts
restricting competition which are unlawful, no matter how beneficent
they may be; no industrial exigency will justify them; they are absolutely
forbidden.”168 This decision, having been made by one of the most
influential judges of the time, reflects the courts’ willingness to outlaw
actions that negatively impacted competition regardless of the economic
benefits. The decision in Alcoa is one of the most famous early Sherman
Act cases and would hold for much of the first eighty years of the Act’s
existence.169
Despite the balanced protection of competition and consumers, the
“Harvard” school of thought would be replaced in the 1970s by a judicial
movement known as the “Chicago” school of antitrust philosophy. 170 In
his article, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, Judge
Robert Bork examined the main purpose behind the creation and
163
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implementation of antitrust law.171 Bork asserted that “Congress
intended the courts to implement . . . only that value we would today call
consumer welfare . . . the policy the courts were intended to apply is the
maximization of wealth or consumer want satisfaction.”172 Citing the
decisions of Judge Learned Hand, including his Alcoa decision, Bork
found that these rulings indicate that the Act was put in place to protect
citizens from harm from corporations who use greed to limit consumer
options, specifically referring to Judge Hand’s reference to the consumer
as “helpless.”173
Bork’s 1966 article and its argument would spark a revolution in
thinking about the purpose and scope of antitrust law enforcement,
furthered by some of the most influential circuit court judges of the last
forty years including Judges Frank H. Easterbrook and Richard Posner of
the Seventh Circuit.174 Judge Posner lays out the Chicago school
ideology as one that is focused around the protection of those purchasing
goods within the market.175 In his work, The Chicago School of Antitrust
Analysis, Judge Posner asserts that actions such as selling goods below
cost do not violate antitrust law, finding them to be an unsustainable
business model that will eventually lead to a return to market competition
after prices inevitably are raised.176 With such powerful judicial figures
leading the charge, the Chicago school flourished as the 20th Century
came to a close with the once Bork-led D.C. Circuit’s decision in
Microsoft serving as a shining example of Chicago-style antitrust theory
put to action. As previously seen, the procompetitive benefits of
Microsoft’s streamlining its products superseded the impact of
competitive businesses in its marketplace, a decision that played a major
role in the FTC’s decision not to pursue action against Google.177
Despite the current move throughout the mid-1900s and early-2000s
to the Chicago style and its most diehard backers, some prominent voices
have begun pushing for a return to the Harvard school of thought, citing,
among other things, the Chicago school’s inability to account for the rise
in internet monopolies. In an article for the Wall Street Journal,
Economics correspondent, Greg Ip, compares the internet behemoths of
Google, Facebook and Amazon to some of history’s most recognizable
171
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monopolies, Standard Oil and American Telephone and Telegraph
Company.178 Google and its internet compatriots have a direct impact on
the consumers of their products, unlike the companies that formed the
purpose for the installation of the Sherman Act and its progeny. 179 As Ip
recognizes, Standard Oil and American Telegraph’s monopolization over
products for sale on the marketplace led to impacts in other areas of the
companies that were bad for consumers, even if the prices of their specific
products, for example kerosene, did not rise themselves.180 When using
Google, however, companies appearing on the website are charged per
click, while everyday users pay nothing. 181 In the face of such
difficulties, “the probability of regulatory action—for now—looks low,
largely because U.S. regulators have a relatively high bar to clear: Do
consumers suffer?”182
In making such a statement, Mr. Ip recognizes the ineffectiveness of
the Chicago school, which has declawed antirust regulation by penalizing
consumers. Despite this pessimism, a return to the Harvard school of
thought could be the change that Mr. Ip, among others, seeks to create a
more inherently fair internet market that drives competition as Congress
originally intended. By returning to the Harvard school, companies
across all industries will be required to act with fair competition in mind,
as seen in Alcoa, rather than just consumer happiness.183 Movements
such as the “New Brandeis” calling for a return to this style could reduce
the barriers of entry imposed by Google by making them illegal, just as
originally intended by the Sherman Antitrust Act.184
IV. CONCLUSION

As this Note shows, it is unlikely that existing American law will
provide the FTC or any other regulatory agency with the ability to bring
legal action against Google, or any other search engine, for its use of
biased methods to benefit lateral businesses. As Section 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act has been interpreted in previous cases, most notably the
D.C. Circuit’s decision in Microsoft Corp., it appears that case law has
remained deferential to a company’s decision to modify its design.
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Combined with potential pro-competitive arguments for such biased
results that could be used by nearly any search engine seeking to provide
similarly biased results, a § 2 claim would likely not meet the threshold
necessary to bring a successful claim against Google in federal court.
Despite the ineffectiveness of current laws, the judicial system can play
a key role in requiring neutrality in search results. By meeting the
original calling of the Sherman Act to protect markets as well as the
consumers within them and in keeping with many holdings of antitrust
cases throughout the first half of the 20th Century, the courts could create
a climate that protects companies’ abilities to compete in markets that are
controlled largely by one company. In doing so, the government can bring
action against dominant companies who use their power positions in one
market to take control of another, as Google did through Google
Shopping. By protecting competition, courts could eradicate such unfair
market prices, in turn allowing more companies to compete for market
shares, fostering competition that has been proven to bring about growth
in markets more effectively than those controlled by single enterprises,
and further benefiting both producers and purchasers in a market.

